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RESOLVING CONFLICTS ARISING FROM THE INTERSTATE MOVEMENT
OF MOTOR VEHICLES: THE ORIGINAL UCC § 9-103
AND ITS SUCCESSOR
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the automobile, the courts of the various states
have been faced with the difficult problem of resolving conflicts be-
tween innocent parties who have unknowingly obtained competing in-
terests in the same motor vehicle. This conflict invariably arises from
the concurrence of interstate movement of the motor vehicle with fraud-
ulent activities of a third person.
In a typical situation, Buyer purchases an automobile from Seller.
He pays $500 down and agrees to pay the balance of $3000 in equal
monthly installments over a period of three years. Seller passes the
automobile's title to Buyer, but retains a security interest which he duly
perfects according to the laws of his (Seller's) state. Buyer makes the
payments for several months, but he has a turn of bad luck and needs
funds quickly. He transports the car to a neighboring state and fraud-
ulently registers it without noting Seller's security interest. Buyer then
sells the car to a bona fide purchaser [BFP] and absconds with the pro-
ceeds. At some later date, Seller discovers that, the car is in the BFP's
possession and brings suit (presumably in the BFP's state) to foreclose
his security interest in the car. The court is now in the undesirable po-
sition of having to allocate the resulting loss between an innocent secured
party with a perfected security interest in a foreign state1 and an innocent
BFP residing in the forum state..2
In most cases the court's determination of the applicable state law will
control the outcome of the conflict. If the law of the foreign state is
applied, the secured party will generally prevail because his prior per-
fected security interest will be superior to the interest of the subsequent
BFP. On the other hand, if the law of the forum state is applied, the se-
cured party's interest will usually not be considered perfected in the fo-
rum state, and the BFP's interest will therefore be given preference.."
UCC §9-103 is the statutory authority upon which most courts rely
in deciding which state law to apply. Although several states have al-
1 "Foreign s:ate" refers to the state of residence of the original secured party. It is ordinar-
ily the state from which the vehicle was removed, and as such, it is sometimes referred to as the
"removal state" in this note.
2 "Forum state" refers to the state in which the suit is brought. It is ordinarily the state to
which the vehicle was removed.
3 This note will focus upon the conflict of laws question and will not consider the problem
of determining priorities within a state.
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ready adopted the 1972 amended version of §9-103, the original §9-103
is majority law today.4 A discussion of the original UCC §9-103 is re-
quired not only because it is still majority law, but also because it is fun-
damental to an understanding of the comprehensive changes made by the
1972 amendments, The amended version of §9-103 will also be ana-
lyzed in depth because it will presumably be the majority law in the near
future. This note will examine the application of the original and the
amended version of UCC §9-103 to conflicts between innocent parties
over the ownership of a motor vehicle that has been transported across
state lines. All states will be categorized as either title states or non-title
states and all possible combinations of interstate movement will be con-
sidered.'
II. THE ORIGINAL UCC §9-103
A. Movement From Non-Title State to Non-Title State
The simplest situation possible under the original §9-103 involves a
conflict between parties residing in non-title states. Subsection (3) con-
trols.7 It states that a foreign security interest which has been perfected
4 As of this writing, ten states have adopted the 1972 amendments: Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Of the forty
other states, all but Louisiana have enacted the original version of UCC §§9-103(3)-(4). Colo-
rado has statutorily excepted motor vehicle titles from these provisions, and Georgia applies
them in conjunction with an earlier statute, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Tide and
Anritheft Act. For a discussion of the law in Louisiana, Colorado, and Georgia see Armor., 42
A.LR.3d 1168 (1972).
Ohio has judicially excepted motor vehicle conflicts from the coverage of UCC §9.103. In
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Birkett L Williams Co., 17 Ohio Misc. 219, 46 Ohio Op.
2d 311, 243 N.E.2d 882 (C.P. 1969), the court dismissed UCC §9.103(3) as not being ap-
plicable to motor vehicle transactions. UCC §9-103(4) was cited, but not discussed. The dei-
sion to exclude motor vehicles from the coverage of §9-103 was apparently based on legislative
intent, although the court's reasoning was less than dear.
The pre-UCC law is discussed in Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1950).
5 References to the case law will be made only to illustrate some of the problem areas of the
original §9-103. No point will be served by discussing the case law in detail. This has been
done elsewhere. See Annot., 42 A.LR.3d 1168 (1972).
6 As used in this note, "'non-tide state" refers to all states that permit perfection of a security
interest by means of filing alone. This includes states that do not have certificate of title acts.
It also includes states that have incomplete certificate of title acts (states in which a security
interest does not have to be noted on the certificate of ride as a condition of perfection). "Tide
states" are those that have complete certificate of tide acts (states in which a security interest
must be noted on the certificate of title as a condition of perfection). For a complete discussion
of this labeling technique and a categorization of all states' perfection requirements, see Ward.
Interstate Perfection of the Motor Vehicle Security Interest: A Bottleneck in Section 9.103, 34
ALB. L REv. 251, 253-64 (1970).
7 UCC §9-103(3) reads, in pertinent part:
If the security interest was already perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where
the property was when the security interest attached and before being brought into
this state, the security interest continues perfected in this state for four months and
also thereafter if within the four month period it is perfected in this state.
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in the vehicle before it enters the forum state continues to be perfected
in the forum state for four months after entry. This perfection is abso-
lute in that it does not require re-perfection in the forum state by the
holder of the foreign security interest in order to obtain the four months
of protection. Thus a purchaser purchasing the vehicle within the four
month period takes subject to the foreign security interest.8 Of course,
the holder of the foreign security interest can perfect for an indefinite
period by re-perfecting in the forum state before a purchase occurs.
The drafters have chosen the four month period as a reasonable pe-
riod of time for the holder of the foreign security interest to relocate the
vehicle and re-perfect his security interest.' In so doing they have at-
tempted to balance the conflicting interests of secured parties and pur-
chasers of the motor vehicle or further creditors of the debtor.
B. Movement From Title State to Non-Title State
Section 9-103(4) applies when a vehicle is moved from a title state
(in which the secured creditor's interest was noted on the certificate of
title) to a non-title state. 10 It provides that perfection is governed by the
law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate--the law of the "re-
moval state."'" The result of this is that in most instances the foreign
secured creditor will prevail and the balancing attempted under subsec-
tion (3) will be discarded.
As can be seen from the prior two examples, i: is advantageous for
8 Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A. C. Lohman, Inc.. 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570
(1962); First National Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. L, Div.
1966).
It has been argued by at least one commentator that the additional four months of protec-
tion should only be conditional. Under this analysis, if the foreign secured party fails to re-
perfect in the forum state within the four mon-h period, his interest, at the end of the four
months, will be treated as unperfected against any BFP, even one that purchased within the
four month period. Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 47
IOWA L. REv. 346, 377-78 (1962). This position is supported !omewhat by UCC §9-103,
Comment 7 (original version), but most commentators agree with the conclusions reached In
Churchill Motors and Stamper that the four mon:hs of protection is absolute. Weintraub,
Choice of Law in Secured Personal Property Transactions: The Impact of Article 9 of the Uni.
form Commercial Code, 68 MICH. L REv. 684, 713 (1970); Note, Section 9.103 ad Tho
Interstate Movement of Goods, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 72, 82-85 (1968); Note, Security
Interests in Motor Vehicles Under the UCC: A New Chassis for Certificate of Title Legislation,
70 YALE L. J. 995, 1020 (1961). A literal reading of §9-103(3) also supports the absolute
protection construction.
9 UCC §9-103, Comment 7 (1972 amendments).
10 UCC §9-103(4):
Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is covered by a certifi.
care of title issued under a statute of this state or any other jurisdiction which requires
indication on a certificate or title of any security interest in the property as a condi-
tion of perfection, then the perfection is governed by the law ol the jurisdiction which
issued the certificate.
11 See note 1, supra.
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a creditor who lends money with a motor vehicle as security to be situ-
ated in a title state. To be so situated can make the difference between
absolute protection for four months and absolute protection for an in-
definite period. Subsection (4) thus appears to be a secured-party-
oriented provision, although it also recognizes the greater protection giv-
en to purchasers by a certificate of title. Very possibly, the drafters of
subsection (4) were hoping that it would pressure legislators (through
the lobbying activities of lenders) to adopt certificate of title legislation."
If all states had followed this course of action, many of the conflicts which
arose in this area might never have occurred.
C. Movement From Title State to Title State
A troublesome situation, not specifically covered by §9-103, can arise
when a vehicle in which a creditor has a duly perfected security interest
is moved from one title state to another title state. If the "owner" obtains
a "clean" certificate 3 in the forum state, he can sell the car to an unwary
resident of the forum state. In a suit for possession of the car, the courts
must decide which certificate is the one referred to in subsection (4).
Three alternatives are possible in making this determination. The
first, and majority, view is that the certificate issued in the removal state
is controlling. 4  Under this view the issuance of a second certificate has
no effect so long as the first one is still extant. A second approach, and
one that has received some support, would find the second certificate to be
controlling.'" The second certificate is seen as revoking the first. Ad-
vocates of this theory emphasize the reliance of the public on the certifi-
cate of title system. They argue that the most recent certificate must be
given priority if the certificate of title system is to function properly.
The third approach holds that subsection (4) does not apply to the multi-
ple certificate situation since it only contemplates the existence of one
certificate.'" If this theory is employed, conflicts will in most likelihood
be resolved pursuant either to subsection (3) or pre-statutory law. All
12 Note comment (4)(b) to the 1972 amendments to §9-103:
It has long been hoped that "exclusive certificate of title laws" would provide a sure
means of controlling property interests in goods like automobiles, which because of
their nature cannot readily be controlled by local or statewide filing alone.
a A "clean" certificate is one that shows no outstanding security interest in the vehicle it
covers.
iM Annor., 42 A.LR.3d 1168 (1972). This approach is consistent with the reasoning of
First National Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (Super. Cr. L Div. 1966),
discussed infra.
1-5 Annot., 42 A.LR.3d 1168 (1972); 4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§9-103:23 (2d ed. 1971); Rohner, Autos, Title Certificates And UCC 9.103: The Draftsmen
Try Again, 27 Bus. LAw. 1177, 1188-90 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rohner].
16 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, §22.7 (1965).
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three theories are plausible, and there is no indication from the language
of subsection (4) as to how the problem should be handled. Under-
standably, the courts and commentators have disagreed.
D. Movement From Non-Title State to Title State
The final, and most controversial situation arising under §9-103 oc-
curs when a vehicle is moved from a non-title state in which a security
interest was appropriately perfected to a title state in which a clean title
was obtained. The courts have split over whether subsection (3) or sub-
section (4) should be the applicable provision. Two cases illustrate re-
spectively the arguments for the two positions: First National Bank v.
Stamperl 7 and Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co. 8
In Stamper a BFP in the forum state failed to successfully defend an
action brought by a foreign secured creditor even though the BFP relied
on a clean certificate issued by the forum state. The court found subsec-
tion (4) inapplicable because of a comment of the Editorial Board of the
UCC which states that the purpose of subsection (4) is to avoid the
necessity of duplicating perfection when there is a certificate of ttle.'9
Essentially, the Stamper court interpreted subsection (4) to apply only to
cases in which the certificate has been issued at the time the vehicle enters
the forum state. 20
The court in Phil Phillips Ford disagreed with the Stamper deci-
sion.2' It cited the comments to UCC §9-10321 in interpreting the lan-
guage of subsection (4) to mandate that perfection be determined under
the law of the state which issued the certificate when the property is cov-
ered by a certificate of title at the time of the transaction in question. 8
Although the reading of subsection (4) by the Phil Phillips Ford
court makes the law of title states preeminent and can cause some seem-
ingly unjust results,2 4 it should be followed. The interpretation of sub-
section (4) by the Stamper court ignores the express language of the stat-
1793 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1966).
18465 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1971).
19 93 N.J. Super. at 164, 225 A.2d at 170.
20See, 47 BOST. U. L REv. 430, 433 (1967).
21 Even though the court disavowed the reasoning of Stamper, the foreign secured creditor
prevailed because the sale to the subsequent purchaser was not in compliance with the Texas
Certificate of Title Act, therefore making it void.
22 465 S.W.2d at 936.
23 465 S.W.2d at 937.
24 A secured creditor residing in a non-title state and holding a perfected security interest In
a motor vehicle could lose his priority in the motor vehicle within a matter of days after it has
been removed to a title state even though he could not have reasonably traced it.
(Vol. 35
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ute. That decision, and others which take the same stance, have caused
a needless problem. Even though subsection (4) is not an example of
precise and comprehensive draftsmanship, its language reasonably per-
mits only one result in cases such as Stamper and Phil Phillips Ford. If
there is a certificate of title covering the vehicle at the time of the trans-
action in question, the law of the state issuing the certificate should con-
trol. Moreover, subsection (4) is prefaced by the language, -[n]otwith-
standing subsections (2) and (3)," indicating that subsection (4) is
meant to create an exception to subsections (2) and (3) when a certif-
icate of title covers the vehicle at the time of the transaction in question.
Also, the Stamper decision renders meaningless that portion of subsec-
tion (4) which specifically includes in its coverage property covered by a
certificate of title issued by "this" state.
Had the Phil Phillips Ford interpretation been followed by all juris-
dictions, it might have been a significant influence on the various states
to pass certificate of title legislation. 25  Secured parties residing in non-
title states would have been much more vulnerable to the actions of
fraudulent parties, thus inducing such states to adopt certificate of title
legislation.
It can be safely hypothesized that except for the perpetrators of the
fraud, all parties concerned would be better served if all states had com-
prehensive-and preferably uniform-certificate of title legislation. A
purchaser's reliance upon official documents issued by his state is reason-
able. If a certificate of title indicates that a motor vehicle is not sub-
ject to any security interests, then a person purchasing in reliance on the
certificate should be protected.
III. THE AMENDED UCC §9-103
The drafters have systematically tried to correct some of the problems
caused by the original §9-103. The 1972 amendments are more detailed
than the original version, and they contain some subtle refinements de-
signed to better balance the competing interests of the various adver-
saries.
A. Movement From Non-Title State to Non-Title State
The amended version of the Code affords the same protection pro-
vided by original §9-103 (3) if a motor vehicle is moved from a non-title
state to another non-title state. The applicable provision is now §9-103
(1) (d) (i). -6 One minor refinement specifies that the four month period
-5 See text accompanying note 12, supra.
26 UCC §9-103(1) (d) (i):
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of protection can be shortened if the period of perfection in the removal
state expires before the end of the four month period. This rule, made
explicit in the amended version, was probably implicit under the orig-
inal §9-103.
A major change from the original version is that the four month
period of protection is no longer absolute.27 It is conditioned upon re-
perfection occurring within four months after the vehicle enters the fo-
rum state. If re-perfection does not occur within the four month period,
then the foreign secured creditor will lose to a BFP who purchases during
the four month period. Thus the drafters have placed a premium upon
efficient tracing, and unless the secured creditor can locate the vehicle
and re-perfect within four months after the vehicle enters the forum
state, he loses all protection.
Although the language of §9-103(1)(d)(i) indicates that the four
month period of protection is only conditional, the comments to the sec-
tion tend to muddle the picture. 8  Comment (4)(c), when discussing
the four month period of protection given in §9-103(2)(b), states that
"during the 4 months the secured party has the same protection for cases
of interstate removal as is set forth in paragraph (1) (d) of the section
[9-1031 and Comment 7." Because the four month period of protection
in §9-103(2)(b) is absolute, it is not the same as that offered in §9-103
(1) (d)(i). Comment 7, referred to in the prior quotation, also indi-
cates that the drafters intended the four month period of protection in
§9-103(1)(d)(i) to be absolute:
"This state" will for four months recognize perfection under the law of
the jurisdiction from which the collateral came, unless the remaining per-
iod of effectiveness of the perfection in that jurisdiction was less than four
months (paragraph (1)(d) ). After the four month period or the re-
maining period of the effectiveness, whichever is shorter, the secured
party must comply with perfection requirements in this state....
(d) When collateral is brought into and kept in this state while subject to a
security interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from which the collateral
was removed, the securi'y interest remains perfected, but if action is required by Part
3 of this Article to perfect the security interest,
(i) if the action is not taken before the expiration of the period of perfection in
the other jurisdiction or the end of four months after the collateral is brought into
this state, whichever period first expires, the !ecurity interest becomes unperfected
at the end of that period and is thereafter deemed to have been unperfected as against
a person who became a purchaser after removal;
27 Protection is considered "absolute" if the secured party does not have to re-perfect in the
forum s:ate within the four month period as a condition precedent to his security interest being
recognized as against a BFP within the four month period.
28Although it would be a strained reading of §9-103(I)(d)(i), a court could conceivably
hold that the fecured creditor has four months of absolute protection. Such a reading would
emphasize the comments to §9-103(1)(d)(i) and the language or §9-103(l)(d)(i) which states
that "the security interest becomes unperfected at the end of that period .... "
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The four-month period is long enough for a secured party to discover
in most cases that the collateral has been removed and refile in this state;
thereafter, if he has not done so, his interest, although originally per-
fected in the jurisdiction from which the collateral was removed, is
subject to defeat here by purchasers of the collateral.
Either the comments are erroneous, or the drafters have erred in making
the four month period of protection in §9-103(1)(d)(i) conditional.
Because the drafters fail to give any reason in the comments for the
apparent change and, indeed, the comments treat the section as if there
were no change, it is conceivable that the courts will reach differing
conclusions as to whether the protection is conditional or absolute.- '
The better view is to treat the four month period of protection as condi-
tional since the language of the statute should be given perference over
the comments.5 0 To the extent that the comments disagree with the stat-
ute, they should be ignored by the courts. Also, the change from abso-
lute to conditional protection is consistent with the general trend of the
amendments, i.e., protection is being taken from secured parties and
given to BFP's.
B. Treatment of Certain Non-Dealer BFP's
Subsection (2) of the amended version of §9-1033' covers all situa-
29 For example, compare the differing constructions of UCC §9-103(4) (original version) in
First National Bank v. S:amper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. L Div. 1966)
and Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 465 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.
1971).
ao well written articles discussing the amended version of UCC §9-103 treat the pro-
tection offered under UCC §9-103(1)(d)(i) as only conditional. Coogan, The New UCC Ar-
tice 9, 86 HARv. L. REV. 477, 535 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Coogan]. Rohner, .supra note
15, at 1185-86.
31UCC §9-103(2):
(2) Certificate of title.
(a) This subsection applies to goods covered by a certificate of title issued under
a statute of this state or of another jurisdiction under the law of which indication of I
security interest is required as a condition of perfection.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the effect
of perfection or non-perfection of the security interest are governed by the law (in-
cluding the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate until four
months alter the goods are removed from that jurisdiction and thereafter until the
goods are registered in another jurisdiction, but in any event not beyond surrender of
the certificate. After the expiration of that period, the goods are not covered by the
certificate of title within the meaning of this section.
(c) Except with respect to the rights of a buyer described in the next paragraph,
a security in:erest, perfected in another jurisdiction otherwise than by notation on a
certificate of title, in goods brought into this state and therafter covered by a certifi-
cote of title issued by this sta:e is subject to the rules stated in paragraph (d) of sub-
section (1).
(d) If goods are brought into this state while a security interest therein is per-
fected in any manner under the law of the jurisdiction from which the goods are re-
moved and a certificate of title is issued by this state and the certificate does not show
1974]
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tions in which a certificate of title has been issued by a title state." When
analyzing any case within the coverage of this subsection, careful atten-
tion should be given to paragraph (d), which provides special protec-
tion for a non-dealer BFP who relies on the forum state's clean certifi-
cate of title. In this situation, the foreign security interest becomes sub-
ordinate to the rights of the non-dealer BFP. This protection is an
exception to the other substantive provisions of subsection (2).
Paragraph (d) recognizes the special situation of the non-dealer pur-
chaser. Inherently, the non-dealer purchaser lacks the experience neces-
sary to create an awareness that prior security interests may exist, and
even to the extent that he is aware of such a possibility he is generally not
equipped to make any extensive checks to verify their existence. Para-
graph (d) also recognizes the fact that reliance on a clean certificate of
title is reasonable and should be protected. 3
One might reasonably ask at this point why a dealer BFP should not
also be protected. Apparently, the drafters have concluded that dealers
should be aware of the possibility of other interests in the motor vehicle
and that they have sufficient means available to protect themselves. For
example, they could obtain insurance, pay an investigator to trace ori-
gins of out-of-state cars,"4 raise the price to absorb potential losses, or wait
until the vehicle has been in the state for a period of four months.8" It
is reasonable to consider these additional expenses as a portion of the cost
of doing business.
The protection given to the non-dealer BFP is by rib means as ex-
tensive as it first appears, and, in fact, is subject to two important quali-
fications. First, because paragraph (d) speaks only of a certificate of title
issued by "this" state, it only applies if the non-dealer BFP relies on a
clean certificate issued by the forum state. If the non-dealer BFP relies
on a clean certificate issued by the removal state, he loses the special pro-
that the goods are subject to the security interest or that they may be subject to secu-
rity interests not shown on the certificate, the security interest is subordinate to the
rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of selling goods of that kind
to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance of
the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest.
32 UCC §9-103(2) is not applicable if a certificate of title has been issued by a state with an
incomplete certificate of title act. See note 6, supra.
3a When discussing the reatons for enacting paragraph (d), the drafters state in comment
4 (e) that "It]his s:ate [forum state) will have every reason, nevertheless, to make its certificate
of title reliable to the type of person who most needs to rely on it."
34 A dealer can ascertain in many instances if a vehicle has been registered in another state
by the certificate of title issued by the forum state. Many states have special codes on their cer-
tificates to warn of the foreign origin. See. e.g., First National Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Su.
per. 150, 154, 225 A.2d 162, 164 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1966).
35 See discussion infra sections 11 (C), (D), and (E) illustrating why a dealer is absolutely
protected after the vehicle has been in the forum state for four months,
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tection of paragraph (2) (d), even though he is just as defrauded as
when he relies on a clean certificate issued by the forum state. Reliance
in both cases is reasonable if the purchaser is in fact a BFP. Therefore,
he should be protected in both cases. Second, if the certificate of title
contains a general warning that the motor vehicle may be subject to se-
curity interests not shown on the certificate, then the non-dealer BFP
loses all special protection given to him under paragraph (d). This is
an unfortunate provision; a non-dealer BFP is no less deserving of pro-
tection merely because his state places a general warning on the certifi-
cates of title it issues. The general warning probably means no more to
a non-dealer than other obtuse form language encountered by laymen.
Even if the language does alert the non-dealer, in almost all instances he
will not have the expertise or resources necessary to take steps to protect
himself. Thus, states adopting the amended version of §9-103 should
either delete the general warning provision from paragraph (d) or alter
their certificate of title acts to eliminate the placing of general warnings
on certificates of title.
C. Movement From Title State to Non-Title State
Section 9-103 (2) (b) controls the situation in which a motor ve-
hicle is covered by a certificate of title issued by the removal state. If
the vehicle is moved to a non-title state, the foreign secured creditor no
longer has the indefinite protection he had under the original §9-103 (4).
The laws of the removal state only govern the transaction for four
months after the vehicle is removed from that state. In contrast to the
four months of conditional protection afforded a foreign secured party
under §9-103(1) (d) (i), a foreign secured party residing in a title state
has absolute protection for the four month period. Paragraph (b) does
not use the specific language of §9-103(1) (d) (i), which indicates that
the security interest is "thereafter deemed" to have been unperfected if
re-perfection does not occur within the four month grace period. Sec-
tion 9-103(2) (b) states only that perfection of the security interest is
governed by the law of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate "until" four
months after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction. Re-perfec-
tion within the four month period is not required in order to obtain pri-
ority over a purchaser of the vehicle within that period.
Further, the four month period provided in §9-103 (2) (b) commences
upon the removal of the vehicle from the removal state. This differs
from the provisions in §9-103(1) (d) (i) and the original §9-103(3),
wherein the four month period does not commence until the vehicle enters
the forum state. This difference could be critical if the vehicle found its
1974]
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way into the forum state by a lengthy, time-consuming route. Both of
these changes illustrate that the amended version tends to deprive the
secured creditor of much of the protection he was afforded under the
original §9-103.
The laws of the removal state continue to govern after the four
month period if the vehicle is not registered in the forum state, whereas
if the vehicle is registered in the forum state, the laws of the forum state
will govern after the expiration of the four month period. The com-
ments state that the reason for the distinction between registered and
non-registered vehicles is the danger of deception to third parties once
the vehicle has been re-registered3 G The determination of what is neces-
sary to "register" a vehicle will presumably be resolved by the laws of
the forum state.3 T If the laws require surrender of existing certificates
in order for a motor vehicle to be registered, the foreign secured party can
possibly protect himself indefinitely by retaining the certificate.88 If reg-
istration occurs in the forum state and a fraudulently procured clean for-
eign certificate is surrendered instead of the original certificate, the ques-
tion arises whether the vehicle has been "registered" within the meaning
of §9-103(2) (b). Using the comments as a guide, courts should hold
that the situation just posited is a valid re-registration because third
parties are in danger of being deceived. If the courts so hold, the for-
eign secured creditor will be limited to four months of protection after
the vehicle has been removed from his state.
The applicability of the removal state's laws to the transaction in ques-
tion can also be affected if the certificate is surrendered. If this surrender
occurs, or the four month period passes coupled with the re-registration
of the motor vehicle, then §9-103(2) (b) provides that "the goods are
not covered by the certificate of title within the meaning of this section."
This can be interpreted to mean that the foreign security interest will no
longer be given effect as to a purchaser in the forum state.8"
One puzzling addition to paragraph (b) requires the courts to apply
the removal state's conflict of laws rules in addition to the other laws of
the removal state. There seems to be no logical reason why the forum
state should apply its conflict of laws provision (§9-103 (2) (b) ) in order
to determine the applicable law, and then apply the indicated state's
30 UCC §9-103, Comment 4(c) (1972 amendments).
37 Rohner states that "registration usually involves the application for and issuance of tags
in the second state [forum state)," Rohner, supra note 15, at 1187. See, e.g,. O111o RHV.
CODE ANN. §4503.19 (Page 1973), which requires an application for registration, payment
of the tax, and issuance of a certificate of registration and two number plates in order for a
motor vehicle to be registered in Ohio.
3 8 Rohner, supra note 15, at 1188.
a9 Coogan, supra note 30, at 547-49.
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general conflict of laws rules. This parenthetical addition to §9-103 can-
not possibly serve a useful purpose. The substantive provisions of §9-103
attempt to balance the relative interests of the competing parties. The
addition of a state's general conflict of laws rules can do nothing more
than confuse the picture and cause results to vary according to the forum
of the suit.
One commentator has suggested a solution to this predicament with-
out ignoring the provisions of the statute. He would treat the entire
transaction as if it had occurred within the removal state, unless the re-
moval state's certificate of title statute has a specific conflicts rule.'0 Even
with this analysis, it would be possible to have different decisions on
identical facts, depending upon the jurisdiction. Such a result seems in-
consistent with the basic premise of uniform laws, and undoes the sub-
stantive provisions of § 9-103.
D. Movement From Title State to Title State
The amended version of §9-103(2) still does not explicitly deal with
the situation of multiple certificates. Implicit in the language of para-
graph (b) is an answer to this problem. The laws of the state issuing
the first certificate control for the four months following the removal of
the motor vehicle from that state, providing that the certificate is not sur-
rendered. At the expiration of the four months the laws of the forum
state will govern the conflict since a second certificate has been issued.
The first certificate is "the" certificate contemplated in §9-103(2)(b).
When it no longer controls due to the passage of four months, the second
certificate becomes "the" certificate.4 This interpretation is not mandated
by the language of subsection (b), but it seems to be the one most con-
sistent with the trend of the amended version of §9-103. It also is the
only interpretation that gives effect to the opening phrase of paragraph
(b), which implicitly refers to the non-dealer BFP exception. If the is-
suance of the second certificate is seen as revoking the first, the non-
dealer BFP exception would not be needed since all subsequent pur-
chasers would be protected.4 -
E. Movement from Non-Title State to Title State
The Stamper-Phil Phillips Ford controversy has been resolved by
40 Coogan, supra note 30, at 547-48.
41 Coogan, supra note 30, at 549-50.
42The third possibility in the multiple certificate case, discussed earlier (see note 15 and
accompanying text), would not appear to be a viable alternative. All cases in which the motor
vehicle is covered by a certificate of title issued by a title state should be conuolled by subsec-
tiot (2).
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paragraph (c). If the foreign security interest was perfected in the re-
moval state otherwise than by notation on a certificate of title and the
motor vehicle was subsequently covered by a clean certificate of title is-
sued by the forum state, paragraph (c) directs the coverage to 9-103(1)
(d) (i). Under §9-103(1) (d) (i) the foreign security interest remains
conditionally perfected in the forum state for four months or until the
expiration of the period of perfection in the removal state, whichever
period first expires. This represents a compromise between the two
positions. The foreign secured creditor is given some protection, but not
nearly as much as was given in Stamper. His four month period of pro-
tection is only conditional, and it is subject to the provisions of §9-103
(2) (d), which give special protection to a non-dealer BFP who pur-
chases in reliance on the forum state's clean certificate of title.
IV. CONCLUSION
The amended version of §9-103 attempts to balance the competing
interests of the possible participants in a suit over title to a motor vehicle.
Secured parties residing in title states no longer have the complete pro-
tection they had under the original §9-103(4). They now have protec-
tion for a period of only four months following removal of the vehicle
from their state. Their security interest is also subject to the possible
purchase of a non-dealer BFP who relies on his state's clean certificate,
Secured parties residing in non-title states have also lost some of the
protection they enjoyed under the original §9-103 (3). Their four month
period of protection has been changed from absolute to conditional, and
this protection can also be defeated by the non-dealer BFP exception.
The dilution of the secured party's rights under the amended version
illustrates the basic intent of the drafters. Secured parties are deserving
of some protection, but they are also in the best position to prevent the
fraudulent transaction from ever occurring. They are generally large
enough to engage in a certain amount of tracing, and they also voluntar-
ily choose to deal with the person who commits the fraudulent act. Se-
cured parties could prevent many of the frauds from ever occurring by
diligently checking the recipients of their credit. If a secured party
chooses to deal with a high credit risk customer, he should insulate him-
self against fraud by purchasing insurance, efficiently tracing removed
vehicles, or increasing rates to all customers in order to absorb losses.
Since the drafters were apparently conscious of the position of the
secured party vis-a-vis persons who deal with the vehicle at a later date, it
is curious that they did not place a knowledge provision refinement into
the four month period. This provision could require action by the se-
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cured party within thirty days after he discovered the location of the re-
moved vehicle. Such a standard would work in the same manner as the
changes already incorporated into the amended version of §9-103. It
would encourage efficient tracing and re-perfection by the secured party,
thereby further protecting third parties. It would be difficult for a third
party to meet this burden of proof, but arguably he should be given the
opportunity to do so.
As mentioned earlier, the protection given to the non-dealer BFP
who relies on his state's clean certificate is an admirable addition to §9-
103, but it is unfortunate that the drafters did not make this protection
more extensive. Dealers were excluded from this BFP provision, presum-
ably because they are better able to protect themselves and should be
more familiar with the pitfalls of purchasing used motor vehicles. Not-
withstanding this exclusion, the dealer (as purchaser) has more protec-
tion under the amended version of §9-103 than he had under the original
version. The protection that secured parties have lost has been gained
by the dealers, later extenders of credit, and the non-dealer BFP. On
balance, this appears to be more equitable than the situation existing un-
der the original version of §9-103.
Even though the amended version of §9-103 is an improvement over
the original version, it remains defective in one area. It does not estab-
lish a uniform system of recording security interests that would inhibit the
fraudulent sales of motor vehicles. The 1972 amendments only balance
the competing interests of the defrauded parties; they do nothing to pre-
vent the occurrence of the fraud. If all states would enact more compre-
hensive and uniform certificate of title acts, fraudulent dealing in motor
vehicles could be greatly reduced. A fraudulent sale of a motor vehicle
could then occur only through clerical error or through the fraudulent
procurement of a second certificate. Furthermore, even these loopholes
could be closed if in addition to the adoption of uniform certificate of
title acts a national computerized system of recording security interests
were adopted. The Permanent Editorial Board's next project should be
to draft and propose some form of uniform recording system, thus mak-
ing the conflict of laws section virtually unnecessary.
Terry L. Overbey
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